How does a fall in house prices a¤ ect real activity? This paper presents a business cycle model in which a decline in house prices reduces geographical mobility, creating distortions in the labor market. This happens because homeowners face declines in their home equity levels, after which it becomes more di¢ cult to provide the downpayment required for a new mortgage loan. Unemployed homeowners therefore turn down job o¤ ers that would require them to move. The model explains joint cyclical patterns in housing and labor market aggregates, as well as the puzzling breakdown of the U.S. Beveridge curve that occurred during 2009.
as strong (Elsby, Hobijn, and Sahin (2010) ). Figure 1 plots vacancies versus the unemployment rate. The …gure shows that the historically strong and negative correlation between the unemployment rate and vacancies, known as the Beveridge Curve, broke down during 2009. An interpretation of this …nding is that frictions in the labor market had become more severe, causing unemployed workers and …rms to be matched less e¢ ciently.
This paper develops a Dynamic and Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE)
model in which house prices a¤ect real activity through a geographical mobility channel. When house prices decline, homeowners face di¢ culties in moving to a new house, reducing their incentives to accept job o¤ers that are not within commutable distances from their current homes. As a consequence, a decline in house prices causes unemployment to rise and output to fall, which in turn feeds back into house prices. The calibrated model can explain joint cyclical ‡uctuations in housing and labor market variables. Moreover, based on only house price and output data, the model generates for 2009 a ‡attening of the Beveridge Curve that is remarkably similar to the one observed in reality.
Joint movements in house prices and mobility arise due to the presence of a re…nancing constraint that is new to DSGE models.
1 Standard constraints tie the amount of debt to the value of the underlying housing collateral and in each period mortgagees have to re…nance their loans (see e.g. Iacoviello (2005) ). The unrealistic implication is that ‡uctuations in house prices a¤ect the borrowing limits of all homeowners during each period. In contrast, my constraint only requires those who move to a new house to re…nance their loans.
In this environment, households can shield their borrowing capacity from a fall in house prices by staying in their current locations, avoiding the need to take out a new mortgage loan. After a fall in housing wealth, it becomes harder to provide the downpayment for a new loan, reducing incentives to move.
Fluctuations in mobility a¤ect real activity through their e¤ects on the process that matches unemployed workers and …rms. This process is modeled following a standard version of the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model, but with the addition that some job o¤ers can only be accepted if the worker moves to a new location. When there are barriers to mobility due to a fall in house prices, more job o¤ers are turned down. Thus, the economy enters a period during which, for a given level of vacancies, the unemployment rate is higher than during normal times. An interesting prediction of the model is that the mobility e¤ects persist beyond the fall in house prices. Moreover, as the amount of leverage among households increases due to structural changes in mortgage markets, real activity becomes more sensitive to shocks, especially to those that arise in housing markets.
The model developed in this paper is the …rst that allows one to study the dynamic e¤ects of house prices on mobility, as well as the spillovers to the labor market and real activity. Because outcomes in all markets are endogenous, one can also analyze feedback e¤ects on house prices. Head and Lloyd-Ellis (2008) and Rupert and Wasmer (2011) have developed models with mobility e¤ects to study the role of housing markets in determining long-run unemployment rates. However, their models are much less suited to study ‡uctuations in housing and labor markets, because solving stochastic versions of their models would be very challenging. In contrast, my model can be easily solved using standard methods.
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The proposed geographical mobility channel is consistent with joint cyclical properties of aggregate housing and labor market data. This is shown in Section 2. Section 3 describes the theoretical model. The predictions of the calibrated model are presented, compared to the data, and explained in Section 4. Section 6 concludes.
Empirical evidence
The idea that house price declines deter geographical mobility has been supported by several micro-econometric studies, including Henley (1998 ), Chan (2001 , Engelhardt (2003) , and Ferreira, Gyourko, and Tracy (2010) . The latter …nd that negative equity substantially reduces homeowner mobility. How-ever, recent empirical research inspired by the turmoil in US housing and labor markets, has delivered some more contrasting …ndings, as reviewed by Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak (2011). 3 A severe drawback of purely empirical studies on the e¤ects of house-lock on the labor market is that the key variable of interest, the fraction of job opportunities that is foregone by homeowners because of barriers to mobility, is unobserved. My approach is to develop a structural business cycle model, and compare the predictions of this model to patterns observed in the data. I focus on the joint cyclical behavior of aggregate housing and labor market variables and consider measures of volatility and comovement that are standard in the business cycle literature. At the center of the analysis are house prices, the number of home sales, and the rate at which workers ‡ow out of unemployment.
A link between these three variables is crucial for the proposed mobility channel to be at play at the aggregate level. But of course, unconditional business cycle statistics provide only limited information. I therefore also estimate a structural Vector AutoRegressive model (VAR), which allows me to condition on shocks that arise in housing markets.
Data and methodology
The empirical analysis focuses on quarterly observations of two housing market variables and three labor market variables. The sample runs from the …rst quarter of 1970 until the last quarter of 2009. The housing market variables are the real house price and home sales. These data were provided by the National Association of Realtors. The house price is the median sales price of existing single-family homes, de ‡ated by the consumer price index. Home sales are measured by the number of existing single-family homes sold in a particular month. 4 The reason for analyzing home sales is that this series can 3 In particular, Schulhofer-Wohl (2011) challenges the robustness of the results of Ferreira, Gyourko, and Tracy (2010) on the basis of a di¤erent coding strategy. In a reply, however, Ferreira, Gyourko, and Tracy (2011) provide additional evidence to support their original …nding and argue that Schulhofer-Wohl's results are due to including temporary moves and noise in the mobility measure. They also call for theoretical frameworks in which both mobility decisions and labor market conditions are endogenous. 4 Monthly series on house prices and the number of home sales were converted into quarterly series by taking simple averages. 4 be expected to be a good proxy for overall mobility among homeowners.
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The labor market variables are unemployment, vacancies, and the unemployment out ‡ow hazard. Unemployment is measured by the civilian unemployment rate as released by the U.S. Department of Labor. Vacancies are measured by the Help Wanted Index, released by the Conference Board. To account for the rise in internet vacancies, I use the corrected series as constructed by Barnichon (2010) for the post 1995 period. The quarterly unemployment out ‡ow hazard is constructed following Shimer (2007) . 6 The …rst part of the empirical analysis consists of a graphical investigation of the data. I consider raw data and construct their cyclical components using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) …lter. Finally, I estimate a structural VAR, which is used to condition on housing market shocks. A detailed description of the VAR used for this purpose and the identi…cation strategy is provided in Appendix A.1.
Is the geographical mobility channel present in aggregate data?
If the geographical mobility channel is relevant, what cyclical patterns would one expect to observe? First, one would expect that during periods when house prices are low, fewer homes are sold. At the same time, there should be a fall in unemployment out ‡ow rates during those periods. Moreover, the geographical mobility channel relies crucially on variations in the e¢ ciency of labor market matching. Thus, one would expect measures of labor market e¢ ciency to decline when house prices fall. Finally, the geographical mobility channel might cause comovements between housing and labor market variables to be particularly strong when conditioning on shocks that arise in housing markets. 5 The main alternative to the home sales index would be the mobility measures constructed from the Current Population Survey (CPS), that distinguish between owners and renters, but are released on a yearly frequency only. This severely limits the information content of these data, especially when constructing business cycle statistics. However, according to CPS data the mobility rate among homeowners fell thirty percent during the period 2005-2009, which is very similar to drop in the home sales during the same period.
6 Shimer (2007) modi…es the series to adjust for a structural break in January 1994, caused by a change in CPS methodology. I would like to thank AyşegülŞahin for sharing the adjusted series. The unemployment out ‡ow hazard, the unemployment rate and the vacancy index are plotted in panels C, D, and E of Figure 2 . The cyclical ‡uc-tuations in these variables seem much related to those in home sales during several episodes. An exception is the period from 2001 until 2004, when home sales increased but the out ‡ow hazard fell. The unemployment rate reached its highest level during the two housing busts discussed above, and the increase in the unemployment rate during recent years was particularly sharp. Note that during the run-up in unemployment in the last year of the sample, vacancies no longer declined. The unemployment out ‡ow hazard, however, declined to a level that is by far the lowest in the sample.
Cyclical components. The cyclical properties of the series are displayed in Table 1 , which reports the volatilities of GDP, home sales, the unemployment rate, vacancies, and the unemployment out ‡ow hazard, relative to the volatility of the real house price. Home sales are more volatile than the real house price.
The real house price, in turn, is more volatile than GDP. The unemployment rate, vacancies and the unemployment out ‡ow hazard are somewhat more volatile than home sales. Table 1 also displays the correlations between the above mentioned variables. Home sales are positively correlated with the real house price. Moreover, both house prices and home sales are positively correlated with output, vacancies and the out ‡ow hazard, and negatively with the unemployment rate. These patterns are consistent with the geographical mobility channel.
In Appendix A.2, I document robustness of these results using an alternative, VAR-based comovement measure.
Conditioning on housing market shocks. Figure 3 shows the dynamic responses to a joint shock in house prices and home sales of one standard deviation.
8 A negative shock leads to signi…cant declines in house prices, home sales and the unemployment out ‡ow hazard. Consumer prices, stock prices, industrial production and the federal funds rate also fall, while the unemployment rate increases.
More insight in the e¤ects of housing market disturbances on the labor market matching process can be obtained by imposing a minimal degree of additional structure. Suppose that unemployed workers and …rms are matched according to a function of the form f (n u;t ; v t ) = n u;t v
is the number of matches, n u;t is the unemployment rate, v t is the number of vacancies, is the elasticity of matches with respect to the unemployment rate and is a scaling parameter. Given a value for and responses for n u;t and v t , one can evaluate the response of the unemployment out ‡ow hazard implied by the matching function, i.e. f (n u;t ; v t ) =n u;t . According to Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) , plausible values for are between 0.5 and 0.7.
9
Figure 4 plots the responses of the actual and the implied out ‡ow hazard for the two extreme values of . For = 0:7, the overall decline of the implied out ‡ow hazard is much smaller than the decline in the actual unemployment out ‡ow hazard. For = 0:5, the initial declines in the two variables are similar, but the actual decline in the out ‡ow rate is more persistent than the decline predicted by the responses of unemployment and vacancies. These results provide evidence for a reduction in matching e¢ ciency after negative housing shocks, although the evidence is particularly convincing for high values of . 8 The idea behind this shock is that I want to study shocks that arise in housing markets and subsequently spill over to th real sector. I consider a joint shock for the sake of a parsimonious presentation. In Appendix A.3 it is documented that the individual responses to a house price and a home sales shock are very similar.
9 Running a simple OLS regression of the log out ‡ow hazard on a constant and the log of the vacancy-unemployment ration results in an estimate for of 0.57. The value of is irrelevant for this exercise. The second ingredient is a …nancial friction on the side of households, in the spirit of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) , Iacoviello (2005) and Favilukis, Ludvigson, and Van Nieuwenburgh (2010) . In their models, borrowing is limited by the value of the underlying collateral and debt contracts are renewed in each period. A consequence of this modeling choice is that a decline in the price of collateral a¤ects the debt limits of all borrowers in the economy. But in reality, borrowers who do not re…nance their loans are typically not a¤ected when house prices fall.
A key innovation of my model is that collateral requirements apply only to new mortgages, which are taken out at the moment when an agent moves.
For existing mortgages, debt is simply limited not to exceed the amount of the previous period.
10 Precisely this feature generates a decline in mobility when house prices fall. Consider for example a fall in house prices that is so large that borrowers' home equity levels shrink to zero. Without any wealth left, it becomes nearly impossible for agents to provide the downpayment required for a new mortgage loan, even a small one. However, when the agent decides not to move there is no renewed downpayment requirement, so the agent can sustain her current level of debt without problems. Consequently, moving is very unattractive in this situation.
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The …nal main ingredient of the model is a friction in the labor market. As in Pissarides (2000) , unemployed agents search for vacancies and occasionally 10 As a consequence, my constraint does not allow non-movers to increase debt after house prices increase. Allowing for home equity loans would introduce a nonlinearity that creates severe di¢ culties when solving the model. Note, however, that the key aspect of the proposed geographical mobility channel is that agents can protect their debt limits from declines in house prices by not moving.
11 My model abstracts from mortgage default. But note that homeowners who default are likely to have di¢ culties in getting a new mortgage for an even longer period of time.
8 receive a job o¤er. But a fraction of those job o¤ers can only be accepted if the agent moves, as commuting would be infeasible. When moving is su¢ ciently unattractive, e.g. because of di¢ culties in obtaining a new mortgage loan, the job o¤er is rejected and the agent continues searching for job o¤ers.
Model description
The model economy is populated by a continuum of households of unit mass.
There are two types of households: impatient and patient households. In equilibrium, the impatient households borrow from the patient ones, but borrowing is restricted by a re…nancing constraint. Each of the two representative households consists of a continuum of members, who are either employed or unemployed. 12 In each period, a certain fraction of the members moves and the household pays a …xed moving cost for each of those members. The desire to move depends on the degrees of satisfaction of members with their current locations, which are idiosyncratic and stochastic. So moving costs are only worth paying for those members who are su¢ ciently dissatis…ed with their current locations.
Employment relationships are destroyed at an exogenous rate, after production has taken place during the period. A member whose job gets destroyed in period t can search for a job in the same period and may have a new job in period t + 1 without becoming unproductive. If not, the member becomes unemployed in period t + 1 and continues searching. The total number of meetings between workers and …rms is determined by a standard matching function, depending on the aggregate number of job searchers and the number of vacancies. However, a …xed fraction of all meetings can only result in a productive relationship if the member moves. This captures the job o¤ers from regions other than the one in which the worker resides. 13 When moving is su¢ ciently unattractive, the job o¤er is turned down and the member remains unemployed.
To impatient households, there is one additional factor a¤ecting mobility decisions, namely the e¤ect on the borrowing capacity of the household. The fraction of debt that the household has to re…nance is equal to the fraction of its members moving to a new location. After a fall in house prices, re…nancing becomes unattractive, which creates a barrier to geographical mobility.
Impatient households
The impatient households maximize the following objective function:
where is their discount factor, c t is non-durable consumption, h t is the stock of housing, is a housing preference parameter, z h;t is a housing preference shock, n u;t is the fraction of unemployed members, each generating a utility ‡ow arising from time spent at home. Finally, u lo;t is a utility ‡ow term that stems from the degree of satisfaction of the household members with their locations of residence, which will be speci…ed below.
Consumption and borrowing decisions. Each period, households decide on the amount of non-durable consumption, housing and borrowing. In doing so, they are restricted by the following budget constraint:
where p h;t is the house prices in units of non-durables, is the …xed cost of moving a member, n m;t is the fraction of members that moves, R t is the gross interest rate on debt to be repaid in period t + 1, y t is wage income per employed member, and d t is the amount of debt. 14 So income consists of wage income, new debt and the sales value of the housing stock of the previous period, and income is spent on non-durable consumption, housing, moving costs, and servicing of old debt. Debt is limited by the following re…nancing constraint:
The important feature of this constraint is that the fraction of debt that is re…nanced depends on the mobility rate, n m;t . If all members move, that is when n m;t = 1, all debt is re…nanced and the constraint reduces to a standard collateral constraint. In that case, the household can borrow up to p h;t h t , that is, up to a fraction of the value of the housing stock. If none of the members moves, that is when n m;t = 0, the household can borrow up the amount of the previous period, that is up to d t 1 . 15 For a given housing stock, h t , a decline in the house price p h;t lowers p h;t h t relative to d t 1 . This makes moving less attractive. Note that in the steady state, the borrowing constraint reduces to a standard collateral constraint. Given the presence of patient households with a higher discount factor, this constraint binds in the steady state. In order to be able to solve the model using a perturbation method, I following the literature by limiting the attention to shocks that are small enough for the constraint not to become unbinding.
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The …rst-order conditions for the amount of housing and debt are:
Equation (4) is the …rst-order condition for the amount of housing consumed by the household. The right hand side is the shadow value of housing, which consists of three terms. The …rst term captures the direct utility gain derived from a marginal unit of housing. The second term is the utility derived from the discounted resale value of the house in the next period. The third term is proportional to the Lagrange multiplier of the borrowing constraint, cc;t , the real house price p h;t , and the mobility rate n m;t . This term stems from the additional borrowing capacity that an extra unit of housing generates. If the borrowing constraint is not binding or if no member moves, this term reduces to zero. Equation (4) states that at the optimum, the shadow value of housing must be equal to the utility derived from p h;t marginal units of non-durables.
Equation (5) is the Euler equation for debt. A binding borrowing constraint introduces a wedge in this equation. The second term within the conditional expectation represents the fact that of the new debt taken on in period t, only a fraction n m;t+1 will be re…nanced in period t + 1. The remaining debt is rolled over to period t + 2.
Location preferences. Geographical mobility is an essential feature of the model. Naturally, mobility decisions are a¤ected by a number of factors. The focus of this paper is on considerations regarding employment and borrowing. However, mobility decisions also depend on more private factors, such as changes in family composition or changes in the degree of satisfaction with the neighborhood. In order for the model to generate realistic overall mobility rates, these considerations need to be taken into account.
The setup is as follows. For each individual member j, an idiosyncratic location satisfaction shock " j;t is observed during period t. 18 This shock represents the private factors that a¤ect how willing somebody is to move. 19 For members that do not move, the realization of " j;t is received as a utility ‡ow, while each mover generates a …xed utility ‡ow instead. 20 So for members with a low realization of " j;t , moving is relatively attractive. For those members that receive a "long-distance job o¤er", moving has an additional bene…t, namely that it enables them to escape unemployment.
The optimal mobility decision implies a cuto¤ level for the location satisfaction shock. If the realization of this idiosyncratic shock is below the cuto¤ level, the member moves, while the member does not move if the realization is above the cuto¤ level. So the cuto¤ level represents the location satisfaction of the marginal mover, being exactly indi¤erent between moving and not moving.
Although there may in principle be di¤erent cuto¤ levels for di¤erent agents, depending on individual characteristics such as wealth and labor income, the advantage of the framework with full insurance among household members is that there will be only two such values: one for members with a long-distance job o¤er, denoted by " do;t , and one for those without such an o¤er, denoted by " t . Let F ( ) be the cumulative distribution function of the shock. Thus,
is the mobility rate among members with a long-distance job o¤er and
is mobility rate among the members without such a job o¤er. It follows from this setup that the total location satisfaction utility term in equation (1) is given by
where n do;t is the fraction of members with a long-distance job o¤er.
Mobility decisions. The two cuto¤ levels that determine the mobility rate are chosen optimally by the household. This decision is taken at the beginning of the period, jointly with consumption and borrowing decisions. 21 The corresponding …rst-order conditions are:
Equation (6) is the …rst-order condition for " t , the moving cuto¤ for members without a long-distance job o¤er. The left-and the right-hand side of this equation are, respectively, the bene…ts and costs of moving, for a member who is exactly indi¤erent between moving and staying. On the left-hand side, is the utility ‡ow that is received for being at a new location. On the right-hand side, the …rst term is the utility loss arising from paying the moving cost .
The second term, " t , is the utility ‡ow received when staying at the current location, which is foregone when moving. The third term arises from the effect of mobility on the borrowing capacity of the household and can be either 21 When mobility decisions are taken, it is known what members have what type of job o¤ers, because o¤ers were received at the end of the previous period. 13 positive or negative. If the borrowing limit on old loans exceeds the borrowing limit on new loans, that is when p h;t h t < d t 1 , there is an additional cost to mobility. Equation (7) determines the cuto¤ level for members with a long-distance job o¤er, " do;t , relative to the cuto¤ for members without such a job o¤er. The di¤erence between " do;t and " t is determined by two factors. The …rst factor is the di¤erence in utility gains from the wage income of an employed member, y t =c t , and the utility ‡ow from unemployment, . The second factor stems from a dynamic composition e¤ect. If more members with a long-distance job o¤er move, more members ‡ow into employment, and this positively a¤ects the fraction of members that is employed in future periods. This e¤ect is captured by G t , which is de…ned in Appendix B.
Equations (6) and (7) are essential in understanding the direct mechanism through which ‡uctuations in house prices a¤ect real activity. Equation (6) reveals a direct and inverse relation between house prices and mobility among members without a long-distance job o¤er. Ceteris paribus, a decline in the house price, p h;t , must be o¤set by a decline in the cuto¤, " t . Recall that members move when their individual location satisfaction is below the cuto¤. Thus, with a lower cuto¤, mobility declines. Equation (7) shows that, ceteris paribus, a decline in " t also lowers the cuto¤ for members with a long-distance job o¤er, " do;t . When mobility of members with long-distance job o¤ers declines, a larger fraction of job o¤ers is turned down, pushing up aggregate unemployment.
Flow equations. The mobility rate among household members, n m;t , follows from the mobility cuto¤s, and is given by
The fraction of members with a long-distance job o¤er, n do;t , is determined by
Here, b g t is the probability that an unemployed member meets a …rm and gets a job o¤er, ! is the fraction of all meetings in which a member is required to 14 move to accept the o¤er, and n s;t is the fraction of members that is searching for a job, which is:
where u is the exogenous job destruction rate. So the group of job searchers consists of the members that are unemployed and the employed members who just became obsolete at their current job. The fraction of unemployed members is equal to the fraction of job searchers of the previous period that did not receive a job o¤er, or that did receive a job o¤er but rejects it because moving is too unattractive:
Patient households
Patient households are the same as impatient households, except that their discount factor, ; is higher than the discount factor of the impatient households, . In equilibrium, patient households therefore lend to the impatient households and as a consequence the patient households are not borrowing constrained. Also, patient households own the …rms and receive their pro…ts.
For patient households, house prices are not directly relevant for mobility decisions because they do not borrow. Let the variables of the patient households be denoted by a tilde. The …rst-order condition for the moving cuto¤ for members of the patient household without a distant job o¤er, e " t , is:
Labor market
Let aggregate variables be denoted by a hat, and let be the share of impatient households in the total population. The aggregate unemployment rate, and the aggregate number of job searchers are, respectively, b n u;t = n u;t + (1 ) e n u;t ;
b n s;t = n s;t + (1 ) e n s;t :
The labor market is characterized by a matching friction. The aggregate number of meetings between …rms and job candidates, b m t , is a Cobb-Douglas function of the total number of job searchers and the aggregate number of vacancies, b v t :
where is again the elasticity parameter, and the scaling parameter. The probability that a job searcher meets with a …rm is b g t b mt b ns;t and the probability of meeting with a worker for a …rm with a vacancy is b g f;t
Firms
Firms that are matched to a worker produce z a;t per period, where z a;t follows an exogenous productivity process with a steady-state level equal to one.
The wage is simply a share of total revenues, that is y t = z a;t . The …rm receives the remaining share 1 . 22 Since …rms are owned by the patient households, they discount future pro…ts using the stochastic discount factor of those households. To …rms, the asset value of a match, V t , is:
where e t;t+1 is the stochastic factor of the patient households, that is, e t;t+1
e ct e c t+1
. Firms that search for employees pay a vacancy cost # per period. Free entry of …rms in the goods market implies that the vacancy cost equals the expected bene…t to the …rm of posting a vacancy:
The term between large brackets in the free-entry condition is the fraction of meetings that is unsuccessful because the worker is unwilling to move. Aggregate …rm pro…ts are given by b t = (1 b n u;t ) (1 ) z a;t #b v t :
22 I deviate from the more standard assumption that …rms and workers bargain over the surplus that is created by an employment relationship. Instead, I assume that …rms post wage contracts in which the worker gets a …xed fraction of the revenues. This setup makes the model tractable but also seems reasonable, given that in this model the total surplus of the match is a¤ected by the utility derived from mobility. It seems implausible that …rms would be able to observe the entire surplus and engage in bargaining over it.
Exogenous processes
The housing preference shock and the productivity shock are common to all agents and evolve according to the following laws of motion:
ln z h;t = h ln z h;t 1 + " h;t ; ln z a;t = z ln z a;t 1 + " a;t ;
where " h;t and " a;t are i.i.d. innovations that are normally distributed, with mean zero and standard deviations h and a , respectively.
Equilibrium
The supply of the total stock of housing is …xed and normalized to one. The aggregate supply of debt is zero. The corresponding market clearing conditions are:
Calibration
The model is calibrated to U.S. data. The frequency is monthly. Several parameters are calibrated to pin down essential steady-state properties of the model and one parameter is calibrated to match the volatility of home sales.
Steady-state targets
The calibration procedure targets six steady-state properties of the model. Sixth, the probability that a vacancy is …lled is 0.34 in the steady state. This implies a quarterly probability of 0.71, as in den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2003).
Parameter values
The parameter values are presented in Table 2 and are discussed below.
Preferences and moving technology. The calibration of the discount factors for patient an impatient households follows Iacoviello and Neri (2009) .
The discount factor of the patient households, , is set to 0.9975, which implies a steady-state real interest rate of about three percent per annum. The discount factor of the impatient households, , is set to 0.9899.
The weight of housing in the utility function, , is set di¤erently for patient and impatient households. The values follow from the steady-state targeting procedure described above. The value for the patient and impatient households are 0.043 and 0.139, respectively. The relatively high value for the impatient households is a direct consequence of the requirement that both types of households consume the same amount of housing in the steady state.
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The idiosyncratic location satisfaction shock is calibrated to be normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation . The standard deviation is important for the volatility of geographical mobility. A lower value of means that preferences for household members' current locations are less 24 This choice follows Iacoviello (2005) and is based on data from the Flow of Funds. 25 This choice is supported by data from the American Household Survey 2007. For households with the very lowest downpayment ratios (up to …ve percent), the median home value is below the median home value for the total sample of homeowners. However, the median home value for households with a downpayment ratio between six and twenty percent is higher than the median for the total sample. 26 Note that when the steady-state value of the housing stock owned by patient households is pinned down, the borrowing constraint determines the steady-state level of mortgage debt. The steady-state level of aggregate debt relative to aggregate income is 22.4 percent. 27 Note that impatient households discount the future resale bene…ts from housing more heavily than patient households. This would lead them to consume much less housing in the steady state than the patient households. As a consequence, the steady state level of debt of the impatient households would be unrealistically low. 18 spread out. I choose the value of to be such that in a version of the model with only technology shocks, mobility is about 2.4 times as volatile as the real house price, corresponding to the relative volatility found in the data for home sales. This is achieved by setting = 3:5.
The roles of the moving cost parameter, , and the utility ‡ow from moving, , are similar. This can be seen from Equation (6), the …rst-order condition for the mobility cuto¤ " t . The parameter is meant to capture physical costs of moving, such as transaction costs and fees for real estate agents. Unlike the utility ‡ow , the e¤ect of the physical cost depends on the marginal utility of consumption, which varies in response to shocks. Following Stokey (2009) , is set to eight percent of the steady-state value of a unit of housing. The parameter is used in the steady-state targeting procedure and its value is -7.144.
Labor market. The elasticity of matches with respect to the number of job searchers, , is set equal to 0.6. The job destruction probability, u , is set The fraction of long-distance job o¤ers, !, is di¢ cult to calibrate as there is no direct equivalent in the data. My strategy is to set ! to one third and check for robustness. Alternative values for ! turn out to generate very similar results. 28 The parameter controls the fraction of the revenues that ‡ows to workers in the form of wages. I assume that accounting pro…ts of the …rms are two percent, that is, = 0:98. This choice is in line with typical calibrations of matching models, see Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2005) .
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The parameter measures the utility ‡ow received per unemployed worker, and is one of the parameters that are used to match the steady-state targets.
Its value is 4:428. Thus, can be thought of as an unemployment stigma.
The negative value for contrasts with standard models with Nash bargaining, in which the parameter is typically positive-valued. However, in those models, the main role of is to determine the surplus from a match, a¤ecting the incentives for …rms to post vacancies. In my model, is only relevant in that it a¤ects the incentives for unemployed workers to accept long-distance job o¤ers. 30 Therefore, a low value of ensures that in the steady state a realistic fraction of workers moves for employment reasons. of course, not all of these households are actually constrained by a borrowing 30 Note that only enters the …rst-order condition for the mobility cuto¤ for workers with a long-distance o¤er. Thus, in a version of the model in which unemployed workers would be able to accept all job o¤ers without moving, the value of would be irrelevant, provided that it is low enough to ensure that unemployed workers always accept a job o¤er. 31 An important reason why the value of has to be so low, is that in the model there are complete insurance markets, and therefore unemployed agents do not su¤er from lower levels of consumption than employed agents. 32 The average is over home purchases with an equity stake of at most …fty percent.
limit. In my benchmark calibration, is set equal to 0.2. 33 In the low-and high-leverage economies, I set = 0:15 and = 0:25, respectively, capturing an increase in the number of households that is eligible for a mortgage.
Exogenous shock processes. The calibration of the persistence parameter of the productivity process, a , follows Kydland and Prescott (1982) . The persistence parameter of the housing preference process, h , is di¢ cult to measure directly in the data. But since there are few a priori reasons to expect that the housing preference process is either more or less persistent than the productivity process, I set h equal to a .
Model results
The model is solved using a …rst-order perturbation method and then simu- 
Business cycle statistics
The model of this paper is very stylized in many respects. For example, the model does not feature capital investment or nominal rigidities. Although the simplicity of the model helps to highlight its essential mechanisms, it reduces the extent to which the business cycle properties of the model can be expected to match the data. Moreover, the most interesting application of the model seems to be to simulate episodes of large falls in house prices, which do not occur very frequently. Nonetheless, it seems important to know how well this simple model can explain "regular" business cycles. I therefore analyze the business cycle properties of a version of the model with only productivity shocks.
Volatilities and correlations implied by the model are displayed in Table 3 .
These numbers can be compared to the volatilities found in the data (Table 1 ).
The predicted volatilities of unemployment, vacancies and the out ‡ow hazard are very low compared to data. This is a general problem of labor market matching models, as emphasized by Shimer (2005) .
For all correlations, the model predicts the correct sign. Moreover, the correlation between vacancies and the out ‡ow hazard, and between the unemployment rate and the out ‡ow hazard, are comparable to their data equivalents. However, there are also quantitative discrepancies between the model and the data. The correlation between the unemployment rate and vacancies is -0.70, which is less negative than the correlation coe¢ cient of -0.90 found in the data. Most other correlations are much stronger than in the data. For example, the correlation between house prices and the unemployment rate is -0.86 in the model, whereas the correlation found in the data is -0.44.
Dynamic responses
Productivity shock. Responses to a sudden one-percent decline in productivity are displayed in Figure 5 , for several calibrations. First consider the benchmark calibration. After a fall in productivity, output and house prices fall. As in standard business cycle models with search and matching frictions in the labor market, there is a decline in vacancies and in the (average) unemployment out ‡ow hazard, and an increase in the unemployment rate. The mobility rate falls after the decline in productivity.
To understand the e¤ects of re…nancing constraints, consider the responses for an economy in which there are no impatient households (no borrowers).
In such an economy, all households have the same discount factor and there is no debt in equilibrium. Thus, re…nancing constraints are irrelevant. The responses for this economy are plotted in Figure 5 as well. Without creditconstrained households, the decline in vacancies is very similar to the decline in vacancies in the benchmark model. The unemployment rate, however, does not increase as much as in the benchmark model. Thus, the presence of creditconstrained households implies a somewhat ‡atter Beveridge curve. This is directly related to the fact that the drop in the mobility rate is also much less pronounced than in the benchmark economy. The declines in output and house prices, however, are quite similar across the two versions of the model.
This indicates that these declines are mainly driven by the direct e¤ects of the fall in productivity.
What are the consequences of structural changes in mortgage markets for the sensitivity of the economy to productivity shocks? Figure 5 plots the responses for the "low-leverage" and the "high-leverage" economies. Financial development clearly causes the mobility rate to be more sensitive to productivity shocks. For the other variables, the responses are very similar across the two economies.
Housing preference shock. How do shocks that originate in housing markets a¤ect the real economy? Figure 6 displays the responses to a negative housing preference shock, generating a house price decline of about one percent on impact. First consider the benchmark calibration. Consistent with the VAR evidence, the model predicts a joint decline in house prices, mobility, output, vacancies and the unemployment out ‡ow hazard, and an increase in the unemployment rate.
Interestingly, the increase in the unemployment rate is larger and much more persistent than the decline in vacancies. For example, eight quarters after the shock, the number of vacancies has nearly returned to its steady-state level, but the unemployment rate is still well above its steady-state level.
percent below its steady-state level.
What are the e¤ects of collateral constraints? Figure 6 shows that in the economy without credit-constrained households, the decline in house prices is smaller than in the benchmark economy. But more importantly, real activity variables do not respond at all to the shock. To see why, note that the …rst-order condition for housing of the patient households is given by:
In the absence of credit-constrained households, this is the only model equation in which the house price enters. 35 This implies that house prices and housing preferences are irrelevant for equilibrium allocations.
36
Now consider the low-leverage and the high-leverage economies. Figure 6 makes clear that structural innovations in mortgage markets substantially increase volatilities. In particular, the maximum responses of the unemployment and mobility rates in the high-leverage economy are much larger than in the low-leverage economy. In contrast, the di¤erences in the response of the real house price are small. Thus, real activity has become more sensitive to ‡uc-tuations in house prices as the amount of leverage in the economy increases, but the feedback on house prices seems limited.
Great Recession experiment
This subsection discusses how well the model can explain observed dynamics of unemployment and vacancies, and in particular the recent ‡attening of the Beveridge curve, as highlighted in Figure 1 . For this purpose, the following experiment is conducted. Using data series on the real house price and GDP for the period 1970 -2010, I back out realizations of the innovations to the productivity and housing preference shock processes. 37 This is simply done by inverting the equilibrium laws of motions for output and the real house 35 Since the aggregate supply of housing is …xed, the house price drops out of the budget constraint. 36 Note that one could simply remove Equation (20) from the system of equilibrium conditions, since one would loose one equation and one endogenous variable. 37 Data were logged and linearly detrended. Quarterly GDP data were converted into monthly data by linear interpolation.
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price. 38 The model is then simulated, using the shocks obtained from the inversion procedure. 38 I assume that at the beginning of the sample, just prior to 1970, the economy was at the steady state. The results are not very sensitive with respect to this assumption, especially given that my focus is on the realizations in recent years. 39 The correlation between the unemployment rate and vacancies is -0.83, whereas it is -0.9 in the data. 40 Appendix B.3 presents the counterfactual evolutions of house prices and output, and shows that without preference shocks, house prices decline only mildly during last 5 years of the sample.
Sticky wages
A clear failure of the model is its inability to generate realistically large volatilities of the unemployment rate and vacancies. In this subsection, I apply the …x proposed by Hall (2005) by considering an alternative version of the model with a constant wage. In particular, I redo the Great Recession experiment, setting the wage equal to its steady-state value in the benchmark model. Figure 1 makes clear that this version of the model predicts an increase in the unemployment rate that is even somewhat larger than the one observed in the data.
The contribution of the housing preference shocks to the total increase in the unemployment rate is about eleven percent. But recall that even with only productivity shocks house prices would fall, so this number does not capture the full e¤ect of the fall in house prices on unemployment.
Understanding the interactions between housing and labor markets
In the presence of re…nancing constraints, outcomes in housing markets are not just passively determined by economic conditions, but have an active role in shaping real economic outcomes. The purpose of this subsection is to better understand this interaction. I focus on housing preference shocks, because this allows me to study the roles of credit frictions and mobility in isolation. I will answer three main questions that arise naturally from the analysis of dynamic responses in Subsection 4.2. First, why are the mobility e¤ects propagated over time? Second, why do vacancies fall following a negative housing preference shock? And …nally, what determines feedback e¤ects of ‡uctuations in real activity on house prices?
Sources of propagation
An interesting model prediction is that the responses of mobility and unemployment to a housing preference shock are more persistent than the response of house prices (Figure 6 ). But what drives this propagation?
Recall that Equation (6), the …rst-order condition for the moving cuto¤ for impatient households, is essential in determining ‡uctuations in the mobility rate. This equation relates the cuto¤, " t , directly to the real house price, p h;t , but also to the stock of housing owned by impatient households, h t , and their debt level, d t 1 .
42 Panel A of Figure 9 plots the responses of h t and d t 1 to a negative housing preference shock, and shows that the reduction in h t is larger than the fall in d t 1 . More importantly, the gap widens during the …rst four years, indicating that impatient households gradually become poorer, and thus less capable of providing downpayments.
To obtain a clearer view on the roles of p h;t , h t and d t 1 in driving propagation e¤ects, consider the response of the moving cuto¤ " t , which is plotted in Panel B of Figure 9 . 43 Note that this response can be reconstructed from the responses of the other variables in Equation (6). As a mechanical exercise, I reconstruct the response of " t , but consider two variations. First, I keep all other variables in Equation (6) except for p h;t at their steady-state levels. This reconstructed response is also plotted in Panel B of Figure 9 . Initially, the fall in the cuto¤ is about as large as observed in the original response. However, the reconstructed response is much less persistent than the original one and it is also not hump-shaped. So clearly, propagation e¤ects are not driven by the real house price itself. Second, I repeat the exercise, but no keep all variables except for p h;t , h t and d t 1 at their steady-state levels. This reconstructed IRF is quite similar to the original one and in particular, it shows a persistent and hump-shaped decline of the cuto¤. Thus, the fall in housing assets owned by the impatient households is essential in driving the propagation e¤ects.
Why do impatient households sell housing stock in equilibrium, following a 42 Equation (6) also relates the cuto¤ to the marginal utility of consumption, 1 ct , and the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint, cc;t . But ‡uctuations in these variables are of secondary importance in terms of understanding the main sources of propagation, as will be discussed below. 43 The shape of this response is very similar to one of the overall mobility rate.
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negative preference shock? 44 Note that Equation (4), the …rst-order condition for housing of the impatient households, can be rewritten as:
and recall that the right-hand side of this equation is the shadow value of housing. The …rst term on the right-hand side is the present value of all future utility delivered by a marginal unit of housing. The second present value arises from the fact that housing serves as collateral for loans. Figure 10 plots the response of the shadow value of housing for both types of households and
shows that there is a larger fall for impatient households.
To understand why incentives to buy housing decrease more for those who are credit-constrained, note the following. For the patient households, the second present value in the …rst-order condition for housing always equals zero, because for them the borrowing constraint never binds (i.e., e cc;t = 0 in each period t). For impatient households, however, there is a decline in the second present value following a negative housing preference shock, because the house prices, p h;t , and the mobility rate, n m;t , both decline. 45 Figure 10 also plots the response of the shadow value for impatient households, reconstructed from Equation (21), but with the second present value is kept at its steadystate level. Without the e¤ects of the re…nancing constraint, the decline in the shadow value is much more similar for patient and impatient households.
The intuition behind the propagation e¤ects is that as house prices decline, a unit of housing provides fewer collateral services, creating disincentives for credit-constrained households to hold housing stock. Moreover, these households expect to move less, and thus rely more on old debt. For those reasons, they gradually decumulate housing assets. But this means that by the time house prices have recovered, they are poorer than before the shock. The patient households, who purchased additional housing stock, have become richer.
46 44 Recall that the aggregate stock of housing is …xed, so any reduction in housing stock owned by the impatient households must be absorbed by the patient households. 45 The Lagrange multiplier on the re…nancing constraint, cc;t , increases following the shock, but this e¤ect does not dominate. 46 In the model, low mobility does not deter trade in housing stock. In reality, it is di¢ cult for non-movers to decrease their housing stock beyond cutting back on maintanance. But
The role of vacancies
Why is there a fall in vacancies following a negative housing preference shock?
This decline is related to the fact that the patient households purchase housing stock from the impatient households. In order to …nance these purchases, the patient households cut back on non-durable consumption expenditures, implying a decrease in their stochastic discount factor, e t;t+1 . Since the …rms are owned by the patient households, a decrease in e t;t+1 implies that the bene…ts from posting a vacancy are more heavily discounted. Therefore, vacancy posting decreases. This e¤ect becomes clear when observing the free-entry condition, Equation (17). The intuition is that in order to take advantage of the increase in returns on housing, impatient households reduce their investments in vacancies.
Feedback on house prices
An advantage of the DSGE framework adopted in this paper is that one cannot only study the e¤ects of house prices on real activity, but also feedback e¤ects. However, it turns out that the response of the house price is quite similar across simulations with small and large mobility e¤ects (Figure 6 ). To understand why feedback e¤ects are quantitatively limited, note that the …rst-order condition for the patient households, Equation (20) 
Concluding remarks
Both the empirical and the theoretical evidence presented in this paper support the idea that geographical mobility can be an important channel through which in reality there do exist other assets in which non-movers can trade much more ‡exibly. For example, households can take on credit card debt or decumulate savings that were initially intended for the downpayment needed for a future home purchase. 47 An increase in job o¤er rejection a¤ects patient households via a decline in …rm profitability, but this e¤ect is small. changes in house prices spill over to the real economy. The model that was developed captures the essence of the mobility channel, but has been kept relatively simple in order to retain transparency and tractability. But it would be worthwhile to model housing and labor markets in more detail.
One obvious simpli…cation of the current model is that it does not feature an endogenous choice between renting and owning. Such a choice would endow unemployed homeowners with the opportunity to accept a job o¤er and move into a rental home. In reality, however, homeowners and renters, as well as their homes, have di¤erent characteristics. Also, due to information asymmetries between landlords and tenants, renters typically have limited discretion over their homes. So the extent to which e¤ects might be dampened depends on how willing homeowners are to move into rental homes. Moreover, an increase in the relative demand for rental homes can be expected to push up prices in rental markets, relative to prices for owner-occupied housing.
Another interesting extension would be to introduce search frictions in the housing market. In the current model, the housing stock is essentially traded on a spot market. Ngai and Tenreyro (2009) show that a model with search frictions in the housing market can generate joint (seasonal) movements in house prices and transaction volumes. One could expect that in the presence of such frictions, a decline in mobility among credit-constrained households creates a fall in mobility among the other households.
A …nal simpli…cation of my model is that it avoids wealth heterogeneity.
This has the bene…t of simplicity. However, since housing wealth and …nancial wealth have been shown to be important drivers of ‡uctuations in mobility, dynamics are potentially even richer in a model with wealth heterogeneity. Notes: The business cycle statistics are averages across 10000 simulations. Standard deviations over these simulations are displayed between brackets. Each simulation has a monthly frequency, has length 1480 and starts from the steady state. For each simulation, the …rst 1000 timer periods were discarded so that 40 years of data remained. Variables were logged and HP-detrended with smoothing parameter value 81 10 5 . This value corresponds to the one used by Shimer (2005) for quarterly data, but is adjusted for the frequency using the factor recommended by Ravn and Uhlig (2002) Notes: Responses to a joint and negative one standard deviation shock in real house prices and homesales. VAR responses are plotted for the unemployment out ‡ow hazard and the job …nding probability implied by a matching function of the form f (n u;t ; v t ) = n u;t v Notes: Responses of the shadow value of housing for the patient and impatient households to a negative housing preference shock. The …gure also shows the IRF for the shadow value of the impatient households when collateral e¤ects are shut o¤. This IRF is constructed from equation (21), but with the second present value term kept equal to its steady-state level.
